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As requested by the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection, this note 
focuses on Articles 14 and 15 of the proposed Directive on services.  These two provisions are 
crucial: they define the “screening” process and the timetable which will make operational the 
“country of origin” principle (Article 16) on which the Directive crucially relies.  As these 
two provisions raise economic more than legal questions, this note focuses on the economics 
of the Directive. 
 
The Single Market: an elusive target 
 
The objective of the proposed Directive is the creation of a functioning Single Market in 
services.  This goal may seem strange, since it is often claimed that the Single Market has 
already been achieved.  But, the past fifty years of the European Union (EU) shows that 
creating a Single Market has proven to be much more difficult and slow than expected. 
 
This is true for the Single Market in goods.  The remaining barriers between the markets of 
the Members States are still high: their lowest average level (estimated in ad valorem 
equivalent, like a tariff) is roughly 8 percent [de Serres, Hoeller and de la Maisonneuve, 
2001].  This estimate is surprising all the more because it concerns only goods highly tradable 
(that is, goods for which barriers should be expected to be insignificant) and because “cross-
border” trade in goods was liberalized in the very early years of the EU, forty years ago.  
Hence, it underlines the crucial importance for a functioning Single Market in services of the 
proposed Directive which precisely focuses on the liberalisation of cross-border trade of 
services. 
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The three main reasons for such an imperfect Single Market in goods are important to 
mention because they underline the crucial role that the proposed Directive will have for 
creating a functioning Single Market in services.  First, European consumers may have 
different tastes.  These differences can be expected to persist for a long time, and little can—
or indeed should—be done to change this situation.  Second, despite elaborate EU 
mechanisms, the potential barriers generated by norms, standards and similar public or private 
regulations are hard to discipline, if only because it is difficult to distinguish between the 
legitimate needs that such regulations may fulfil and their use as trade impediments. 
 
Last but not least, trade in goods requires complementary services, and the Single Market in 
services is still in an embryonic stage.  Estimates do not exist of the impact of remaining 
internal barriers in services comparable to those mentioned above for trade in goods.  But, 
there are indicators showing the very limited impact of the existing Directives in services.  As 
Table 1 shows, the dispersion of the barriers to entry in the seven services examined is as 
wide among Member States as among all OECD countries, and it is as large in the services 
already covered by EU Directives than in the one not yet covered (retail distribution). 
 
The even more limited Single Market in services flows from two specific reasons.  Only 
infrastructure services (banking, telecoms, transport, energy, etc.) are covered by the existing 
Directives—a deliberate choice made by the Member States when designing the 1992 
Programme in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Second, in accordance with the prevailing 
views of this time, the existing Directives focus much more on establishment than on cross-
border trade (the main exception being the Directive “Television without Borders”).  But, 
there are robust economic arguments suggesting that competitive pressures based on freer 
establishment tend to be weak—a conclusion consistent with the information provided by 
Table 1. 
 
This brief description suggests two lessons.  First, if one really wants to create a functioning 
Single Market in services, the insistence of the proposed Directive on cross-border aspects is 
very much needed for boosting competitive pressures.  Second, the three forces which have 
made progressive the emergence of the Single Market in goods will also play a role in the rise 
of a Single Market in services.  This is an essential point missed by the “doomsday” critics of 
the proposed Directive: the Directive will not eradicate all the barriers on trade in services in 
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one stroke and it will not instantly expose Member State services markets to cut-throat 
European competition.  Rather, its impact will be progressive, allowing everybody to adjust to 
more competitive markets. 
 
Two lists of requirements 
 
A functioning Single Market requires the elimination of all the artificial barriers to entry 
which allow incumbent (generally powerful) firms to keep or create artificial dominant 
positions, and hence to extract unjustified rents.  These rents hurt consumers—businesses as 
well as households—and they are large enough (in the case of goods, they represent 30 to 40 
percent of the costs of European protection [Messerlin 2001]) to impose a severe drag on the 
growth that Europe needs so much in order to more smoothly resolve its serious problems of 
unemployment and demographic trends. 
 
Articles 14 and 15 aim to eliminate these artificial barriers by providing two lists of 
“requirements” (in the Directive parlance) that Member States impose on market access to the 
services covered by the Directive: the requirements to be eliminated because they constitute 
undisputable barriers to entry (Article 14) and those to be “evaluated” for possible elimination 
or adaptation to the extent that they have a trade barrier component (Article 15).  These lists 
give a clear, predictable description of the requirements to be examined.  But, what about the 
requirements not listed, but of equivalent effects, which could then escape adequate 
disciplines (ban or evaluation)?  In its explanatory memorandum of the proposed Directive, 
the Commission makes clear that the requirements not included in the two lists but having 
equivalent effects will be investigated under Article 43 of the Treaty. 
 
This flexible approach in three tiers (ban under Article 14 of the Directive, evaluation under 
Article 15 of the Directive, and infringement procedures under Article 43 of the Treaty) 
deserves two remarks. 
 
First, the proposed Directive largely “systemizes” the case law of the Court of Justice on 
Article 49 of the Treaty (prohibition of restrictions on freedom to provide services).  This 
strong link with the case law of the Court of Justice has led some observers to criticize the 
proposed Directive on the basis that it would reflect the “government of the judges,” not a 
democratic decision.  This criticism misses the key point that the Court of Justice interprets 
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the Treaties which have been democratically decided by the political bodies of the Member 
States—Parliaments and governments. 
 
Second, effective competitors are often slow to emerge, as abundantly illustrated by available 
evidence.  For instance, the three “packages” of EU Directives on air transport have had little 
impact during 15 years—until a few “low-cost carriers” emerged as serious rivals in certain 
markets which were often unexploited by incumbents.  (The same story happened in the case 
of U.S. air transport liberalisation.)  Once again, such evidence shows that the proposed 
Directive is unlikely to generate a brutal shift to competitive markets, but rather that its 
impact will be progressive. 
 
That said, the current draft of the proposed Directive raises two concerns.  First, the 
requirements listed in Articles 14 and 15 consist mostly in quantitative restrictions: maximum 
number of establishments, territorial restrictions, conditions on the shareholding, etc.  The 
Directive does not mention subsidy-based requirements, with the exception of the indirect 
(and elliptic) Article 14(7) on financial guarantees and Article 15(2h) on below cost pricing.  
Devoting more attention to subsidies is desirable, even if the anti-subsidy rules under the 
Treaty may often be sufficient to cope with them.  Monitoring subsidies in services will be 
particularly difficult because the scope for creating different “varieties” is almost endless in 
services—competition in services markets relies on “varieties” much more than on prices.  
For instance, le t us assume that a government subsidises the consumption of the domestic 
variety of a service.  Although such a subsidy is non discriminatory (all the firms selling on 
the domestic market in question benefit from it) it may provide a strategic advantage to the 
domestic firms selling this variety of services to the other European markets if these firms 
have a large share of the domestic market in question (and hence receive the largest share of 
the subsidy in question) and if the non-domestic firms are initially not very active in this 
variety of the service in question. 
 
The second source of concerns flows from the fact that Articles 14 and 15 do not evoke a 
crucial difficulty which may occur when liberalising markets shaped by decades of inadequate 
regulations: their long- lasting anti-competitive effects.  For instance, regulations restricting 
access to land for retail use have been adopted for protecting small domestic shopkeepers in 
some Member States.  These regulations have been quite unsuccessful in achieving this 
goal—a point that emphasises the pivotal role of the “evaluation” concept included in the 
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proposed Directive (see below).  Rather, over two decades, these regulations have favoured 
the emergence of a very concentrated retail industry behind high barriers to entry for foreign 
competitors, and they have generated an opaque environment for politicians and civil servants 
opening the door to corruption.  Article 15(2a) which lists this restriction does not recognize 
the serious problem of the long-lasting anti-competitive consequences of such an inadequate 
regulation. 
 
The “screening” process 
 
The Directive provides some procedural guidelines that Member States shall follow when 
undertaking the review of their requirements to be eliminated and evaluated.  It should be 
more explicit in three respects. 
 
First, Article 14 relies on the implicit assumption that spotting prohibited requirements will be 
neither difficult nor controversial.  This assumption is unlikely to be verified.  In a non-
negligible number of cases, one should expect opposing views between the imposing Member 
State and the other Member States on whether a given regulation constitutes a requirement 
under Article 14, or not.  Of course, such problems could be addressed by resorting to the 
Court of Justice.  But it would be wise to pre-empt such a costly legal approach by imposing 
some form of collective action during the transposition period.  The simplest one would be to 
expand the procedure of “mutual evaluation” enounced in Articles 15(4) and 41 (in which 
each Member State provides a report justifying its position, see below) to the litigious cases 
under Article 14. 
 
Second, Article 15(3) states three criteria for the “screening process” to be implemented for 
evaluating the requirements listed: non-discrimination, necessity and proportionality.  The use 
of the first criterion is unlikely to generate much debate, although it might be the source of 
litigious cases, as illustrated in the consumption subsidy case evoked above.  But, the second 
and third criteria are almost certain to generate conflicts because they are expressed in very 
general terms.  The necessity criterion states that “requirements must be objectively justified 
by an overriding reason relating to the public interest” whereas the proportionality criterion 
imposes that the “requirements should not go beyond what is necessary to attain” the 
objective pursued.  As illustrated by the past debates on the infrastructures services already 
subjected to Directives, there is a very wide set of views among Europeans on necessity and 
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proportionality (reflected in the Court of Justice rulings which do not offer stable references 
beyond the broad principles).  For instance, some Europeans still argue that public interest can 
be only be achieved by public monopolies, and dismiss alternative regulatory structures which 
would potentially enable the public interest to be achieved more efficiently or at lower cost. 
 
Last but not least, the procedure of “mutual evaluation” sketched in Article 15 and developed 
in Article 41 (Member States report, the Commission consults, the Committee monitoring the 
Directive enforcement debates) is much too bureaucratic and centralised—hence inadequate.  
The review procedure (Article 43) suffers from the same weaknesses, and it is much too 
infrequent (every three years) to be expected to do an adequate job.  Lastly, the crucial (see 
below) procedure of “administrative cooperation” is mentioned in the explanatory 
memorandum of the Commission, in the Directive Preamble, and in the legislative financial 
statement attached to the Directive—but it does not appear in the Directive text itself, and it is 
never explained in detail. 
 
A “culture of evaluation” 
 
All these problems are serious, and they all point in the same direction: the Directive is too 
elusive on the role of the Member States—remarkable given the extent to which it is based on 
the country of origin principle.  The Directive is sometimes criticized for being market-
oriented, and it is.  But, these criticisms miss a crucial point in regulatory matters: more 
efficient markets require better governments—that is, markets and governments can be 
complementary—and this is valid at both the EU and Member State level. 
 
Too often, current European governments are content with loosely defined goals, and they 
rarely check whe ther the regulations they adopt fit the proclaimed goals.  A first illustration 
was provided above, regarding the land restrictions for retail use. Another example is the 
requirement of a minimum distance between pharmacies.  What is the desired objective of 
such a requirement?  If loosening competition between pharmacists has been the price paid in 
order to get better health services, has this goal been achieved?  What are the (unintended or 
not) costs of using such instruments to try to ensure better services (monopolistic behaviour of 
pharmacists, higher costs of running this essential retail activity for the people health, etc.)?  
Is there no other, more direct, regulation(s) for getting the best services possible from 
pharmacists?  Such examples abound in every Member State. 
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In sum, “good governance” requires better definition of the goals of regulations and better 
monitoring of the implementation in order to assess their real effects.  Despite its limits, the 
evaluation process included in the Directive is intimately based on such a dynamic view of 
better governance: more efficient markets require better governments, and better governments 
nurture more efficient markets.  But, it is clear from the above examples that a full 
enforcement of the proposed Directive requires more than a short reference to mutual 
evaluation.  It requires a more robust “culture of evaluation” in every Member State, and the 
development of procedures of administrative cooperation. 
 
However, in most Member States, such a culture of evaluation is very weak today and the 
necessary institutions are embryonic [Hahn and Litan 2004].  The main weakness of the 
proposed Directive is its silence on this crucial aspect.  In every Member State, there are 
bodies which are natural candidates for a key role in the national evaluation process, such as 
the Courts of Accounts (possibly after some reshuffling of their activities and procedures).  
“Mutual evaluation” should thus take a quite different dimension.  Far to be limited to a 
bureaucratic and centralized structure (with the Commission being the “hub”, and the Member 
States the “spokes”) it should be rooted in an EU-wide collective peer review among the 
national regulatory bodies. 
 
The Directive does not insist on this crucial phase (perhaps because it is a domestic problem 
of the Member States).  But this discretion will be costly for a functioning Single Market in 
services because the introduction of a culture of evaluation in every Member State level is a 
necessary condition for the success of the Directive—and because it is intimately consistent 
with the country of origin principle which makes the Member States the key source of 
regulatory initiatives. 
 
Reinforcing Member States’ capacities to address the issues raised by the enforcement of the 
proposed Directive does not mean weakening the European level.  In this respect, it is 
interesting to look at the recent experience of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) [Hahn and Litan 2004] and to think where to locate an equivalent European OMB (it 
may not necessarily be in the Commission, for reason of conflict of interest). 
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Additional advantages of this more decentralized procedure are to better ensure that the 
screening process will be permanent, and that it could involve regional bodies (a point left 
aside by the Directive, despite the crucial role of these bodies in the services regulations in 
many Member States). 
 
In sum, a serious enforcement of the proposed Directive requires substantial preliminary work 
at the Member State level.  It thus seems that the time schedule suggested by the proposed 
Directive would require at least one (maybe two) additional years at the very early stage—for 
every Member State to be ready 
 
Regulatory convergence? 
 
Often, the proposed Directive leaves a sense that Member States’ regulations will “converge” 
after some time.  This “harmonisation nostalgia” seems inconsistent with the country of origin 
principle and the culture of evaluation generated by the Directive.  This point deserves 
attention all the more because it is related to the fears that the proposed Directive would 
trigger a “race to the bottom” in regulatory matters among Member States. 
 
If there is one lesson to be drawn from the experience of the last thirty years in regulatory 
reforms, it is that there is not one instrument or set of instruments for reaching a given 
objective.  For instance, public interest in telecoms is generally defined as the fact that every 
citizen gets an easy access to a telephone.  For years, this objective has been understood as 
requiring a public firm to cross-subsidize rural and urban lines, short and long distance calls.  
But, competition between providers of mobile telephony in the 1990s was instrumental to 
provide phones to the poorest Europeans—those who were de facto largely excluded from the 
service of public fixed lines because they did not have a stable home.  This competition was 
also instrumental for a much more intensive use of the fixed lines built by the public firms (in 
the mid 1990s, the French Railways used only a fraction of their line capacity), and hence for 
a better utilisation of and return on past public investments. 
 
This basic lesson suggests that competition between Member States for offering the best 
regulations they can design, taking into account their strengths and weaknesses, is desirable 
for growth and welfare purposes, and it justifies the culture of evaluation.  Such a regulatory 
competition makes unlikely the “regulatory convergence” floated by the Directive (except in 
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the narrow sense of requirements to be eliminated or evaluated) if only because competition 
in services is so subtle (it has many more dimensions than prices). 
 
This perspective of regulatory competition among Member States raises fears in Europe 
because it is associated to the risks of a “race to the bottom”—that is, to the risks that 
countries would adopt ever weaker social, environmental, etc., regulations. 
 
Before examining this question, it is important to have two sets of facts in mind.  First, the 
last decade or so has witnessed a “race to the top” in the industrial countries (and the same 
begins to be observed in emerging developing countries—from Mexico to India).  For 
instance, less regulations on the day-to-day functioning of the markets of goods has been 
clearly accompanied by more regulations in environmental matters.  Similarly, firms—with 
the regulatory support of the ir home countries—have been involved in a severe and 
continuous race to the top in terms of product quality.  Second, consumer contracts, the 
posting of workers and social security are largely excluded from the field of application of the 
proposed Directive, and the marginal relevance of the Directive in these matters may indeed 
rather provide incentives for higher standards. 
 
That said, the concept of a race to the bottom assumes that low standards are associated with 
higher and/or better growth.  There is no evidence of such a correlation.  On the contrary, 
growth and welfare require a substantial threshold in terms of standards, as documented in the 
key case of labour regulations [OECD 2000].  Above the threshold, things become more 
complex because of the many trade-offs that people may envisage (for instance, more leisure 
versus higher income).  These complex trade-offs offer the possibility for different regulatory 
standards to coexist with no need for any of them to engage in a race to the bottom.  Indeed, 
these many possible trade-offs are the fundamental reason for a permanent regulatory 
competition between Member States in their endless search for the “magic regulatory 
formula” nurturing the many conceivable varieties of a given service. 
 
In regulatory matters, countries have a common feature with firms: they have to take into 
account their “reputation”—a particularly crucial point in the context of the country of origin 
principle which fundamentally requires “trust” between Member States.  Firms based in a 
Member State having chosen to race to the bottom will rapidly run the risk of losing 
consumers, and paying a high price for such a choice.  This may be true even if a Member 
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State races to the bottom in one service (and not in the others) since reputation has often 
strong spill-over effects.  Last but not least, democracy generates powerful barriers against a 
race to the bottom, and strong incentives for a race to the top. 
 
Three concluding remarks 
 
First, the very wide coverage of services is a precious feature of the Directive: it ensures that 
investments will go to the different sectors on a sound basis.  Reducing this coverage would 
introduce distortions: the services excluded from the Directive coverage would become 
attractive to investors because they remain protected from competition, and generate 
unjustified rents.  Such distortions generate stagnation in the long run and impose massive 
costs of re-adjustment in case of liberalization at a later stage. 
 
That said, one can deal with “sensitive” services in two ways.  First, requests for longer 
transition periods could be examined.  This solution is acceptable if delays are not too long—
that is, if they do not give enough time to the Member States and firms concerned to find 
devices limiting competition in the future in the services in question.  Second, requests for 
definitive exemptions should be subjected to the “culture of evaluation.”  There is a strong 
case for arguing that such requests should not exempt the services in question from the 
thorough analysis imposed on the services to be covered by the Directive. 
 
Second, the Directive raises some “border” issues with existing or forthcoming legal 
instruments.  On the one hand, the focus on cross-border trade of the proposed Directive—and 
its related positive elements—should be applied to the previously “liberalized” infrastructure 
services, in order to make a better functioning Single Market in these services.  On the other 
hand, the potential (limited) conflicts between the Directive and the proposed Rome II 
Regulation should be settled by giving precedence to the Directive which has a pro-growth 
potential that the Regulation does not have. 
 
Lastly, the proposed Directive is unlikely to have any impact on the current negotiations on 
services at the World Trade Organization.  The proposed Directive adheres to quite a different 
logic than that of WTO negotiations.  It can be seen as a joint unilateral liberalization—with 
25 countries recognizing simultaneously the trust they have in each other, in accordance with 
the country of origin principle.  There is no place in the Directive for balanced concessions 
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which are the mark of WTO negotiations, and there is little room in the WTO for the trust on 
which the Directive relies.  Moreover, the country of origin principle recognizes the key role 
of Member States in regulating their services, in full accordance with the current devolution 
of power between the EU and its Member States in the WTO forum. 
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Table 1.  Barriers to entry in selected services, 1998      
(the scale of indicators is 0 to 6, from least to most restrictive)     
        
Air passenger transport Road freight Mobile telephony  
              
United States 2.0 Britain 0.6 Britain 0.0   
New Zealand 2.2 New Zealand 0.6 Finland 0.0   
Netherlands 2.6 Finland 0.6 France 0.0   
Norway 3.1 Korea 1.4 Italy 0.0   
Austria 3.1 United States 1.5 Netherlands 0.0   
Ireland 3.1 Canada 1.6 Sweden 0.0   
Britain 3.3 Norway 1.8 Australia 0.0   
Belgium 3.3 Sweden 2.0 Japan 0.0   
Germany 3.4 Portugal 2.4 Korea 0.0   
Sweden 3.4 Mexico 2.6 New Zealand 0.0   
Australia 3.5 France 2.6 Austria 3.0   
Denmark 3.6 Austria 2.8 Belgium 3.0   
Italy 3.8 Germany 3.2 Denmark 3.0   
Finland 3.8 Belgium 3.3 Germany 3.0   
Spain 3.9 Spain 3.4 Greece 3.0   
France 4.1 Greece 3.4 Ireland 3.0   
Canada 4.1 Italy 4.9 Portugal 3.0   
Korea 4.4 Denmark  Mexico 3.0   
Japan 4.7 Ireland  Norway 3.0   
Mexico 4.7 Netherlands  Switzerland 3.0   
Portugal 5.1 Australia  Spain 4.5   
Switzerland 5.1 Japan  Canada    
Greece 5.1 Switzerland   United States     
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Electricity Railways Retail distribution   
              
Britain 0.0 Germany 0.0 Canada 0.6   
Finland 0.0 United States 0.0 Australia 0.7   
Sweden 0.0 Britain 3.0 Netherlands 0.8   
New Zealand 0.0 Sweden 3.0 Switzerland 1.0   
Norway 0.0 Canada 3.0 Ireland 1.0   
Australia 0.3 Japan 3.0 Norway 1.1   
Germany 2.7 Belgium 6.0 Germany 1.2   
Denmark 4.0 Finland 6.0 Sweden 1.6   
Japan 4.0 France 6.0 Mexico 1.7   
United States 4.0 Ireland 6.0 Korea 1.9   
Spain 4.7 Italy 6.0 Spain 2.0   
Belgium 5.0 Spain 6.0 Britain 2.1   
Portugal 5.3 Korea 6.0 Belgium 2.3   
France 6.0 Mexico 6.0 Italy 2.8   
Greece 6.0 Norway 6.0 Portugal 2.8   
Ireland 6.0 Switzerland 6.0 Finland 3.0   
Italy 6.0 Austria  France 5.0   
Netherlands 6.0 Denmark  Austria 5.5   
Canada 6.0 Greece  Denmark    
Austria  Netherlands  Greece    
Korea  Portugal  Japan    
Mexico  Australia  New Zealand    
Switzerland   New Zealand   United States     
Source : Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud (2000).  
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